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CASE NOTES
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION-UPON WHOM SHALL
THE DUTY TO SUPPORT REST?
The State of California brought criminal proceedings against the defendant,
Follmer Sorensen, charging him with violating section 270 of the California
Penal Code,' for failure to support a child born to the defendant's wife and
conceived by artificial insemination. Because of the defendant's sterility,2 his
marriage had remained childless and after receiving the defendant's written
consent, a physician inseminated the defendant's wife, as a result of which a
child was born. The defendant represented to friends that he was the father
of the child, and treated the child as his own. Four years after the child's
birth, the Sorensens separated with Mrs. Sorensen retaining custody of the
child and agreeing that the defendant would not have to provide support. The
Sorensens were later divorced. Two years after the divorce decree, Mrs. Sor-
ensen became ill and in order to support her child applied for and received
financial assistance under the Aid to Needy Children Program of Sonoma
County. The District Attorney's Office demanded that the defendant provide
support, and when he failed to comply, they brought this action. The Munic-
ipal Court found the defendant guilty. The defendant's appeal was transferred
to the Court of Appeals on certification.3 The Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court's decision, holding that the State could not sustain its burden of
proving the defendant's paternity on a theory of estoppel. On rehearing the
Supreme Court of California vacated the appellate court's judgment and af-
firmed the trial court's decision, holding that the consenting husband to artifi-
cial insemination was the lawful father of a child so conceived within the
meaning of section 270 of the California Penal Code. People v. Sorensen, 68
Cal. 2d 285, 437 P.2d 495 (1968).
Sorensen is important as it represents the first decision of a court of last
resort in the area of artificial insemination, and because it is the first criminal
1 CAL. Pm. CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1967), "[a] father of either a legitimate or illegiti-
mate minor child who wilfully omits ...remedial care for his child is guilty of a mis-
demeanor .... "
2 BLACx'S LAW DIcTioNARY 1584 (4th ed. 1951) defines sterility as an "incapacity to
germinate or reproduce."
3People v. Sorensen, 254 Cal. App. 2d 869, 62 Cal. Rptr. 462, 463 (1967): "The
appeal comes before the court on certificate, pursuant to rule 62 (a) of California Rules
of Court, ...that the transfer is necessary to settle an important question of law. ...
Whether the husband of a woman who, with his consent, was artificially inseminated ...
may be found guilty ... in violation of section 270 of the Penal Code."
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case to date to discuss both the legal relationship between a child conceived
by artificial insemination and the consenting husband, and the corresponding
liability for non-support. The purpose of this note is to analyze the reason-
ing of the court in determining what relationship existed, and the resulting
liability. As Sorensen is a case of first impression, it will be necessary to ex-
amine the decisions reached by prior civil cases when faced with similar prob-
lems. Classically, there are three methods by which one could legally be
considered a father: a biological father, statutory adoption, and adoption by
acknowledgment. These methods have no application for determination of
paternity in artificial insemination cases.4 Since liability for non-support, both
civil and criminal, is an incident of paternity, the first step in analyzing
Sorensen will be an examination of prior artificial insemination cases in which
the paternity issue was discussed. Where paternity is absent some other theory
for establishing liability for non-support must be presented. Therefore, a com-
plete analysis of Sorensen will require a review of the cases which have dis-
cussed liability for non-support, although finding the consenting husband not
to be the father. Since legislative action will probably be required in this area,
consideration will also be given to the possible effects Sorensen will have in
instituting future legislation. Although the number of cases dealing with
artificial insemination have been few, the probability of a large number of
such cases arising is great.5
Artificial insemination is defined as "the introduction of semen of the hus-
band (homologous) or of another (heterologous) into the vagina otherwise
than through the act of coitus." 6 The legal problems concerning artificial in-
semination arise from heterologous insemination and hereinafter, the term
artificial insemination will relate only to this type of insemination. It is the
general practice of physicians in artificial insemination cases to obtain the
written consent of the husband prior to treating the woman. The selection of
a donor is made in such a way that his physical characteristics and appearance
resemble, as closely as possible, that of the husband. The donor remains
anonymous and the identity of the woman inseminated is withheld from the
donor.
The decisive issue in Sorensen was a determination of whether the defendant,
a consenting husband to artificial insemination, was the father of the child
4 The husband is obviously not the natural father. Adoption, being statutory, requires
strict compliance with the particular statute. Adoption by acknowledgment applies only
to the putative father acknowledging the child as his own, after a subsequent marriage
to the mother.
5 It had been estimated that there were from 20,000 to 100,000 people born by artificial
insemination in 1941 and the number could be expected to grow. Seymour and Kearner,
Artificial Insemination, 116 A.M.A.J. 2742 (1941).
6 STEDMAN'S MEDIcAL DIcTioxARY 776 (20th 6d. 1961).
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so conceived. Since the classical methods for establishing paternity have no
application to artificial insemination, a review of how prior civil cases have
handled the problem will be necessary. The earlier artificial insemination
cases, when faced with the problem of determining paternity, found the con-
senting husband to be the father of a child conceived by artificial insemina-
tion. In these cases, the issue of paternity arose in conjunction with a deter-
mination of the husband's visitation privileges, and since the welfare of the
child is given a great deal of consideration in visitation cases, it undoubtedly
had a significant effect on the court's reasoning. The first of these cases,
Strnad v. Strnad,7 involved an action brought in order to have part of a di-
vorce decree providing for the consenting husband's visitation rights removed.
The plaintiff contended that the child was conceived by artificial insemina-
tion and by virtue of that fact the defendant was not the father. The court
rejected this contention holding the husband to be the father. The theory of
the court in reaching this .conclusion was "[t] hat the child has been potentially
adopted or semi-adopted by the defendant" and the relationship between the
defendant and child might be described as similar to a foster parent who had
adopted the child.9 The court further held the child to be legitimate, drawing
an analogy to "the case of a child born out of wedlock who by law is made
legitimate upon the marriage of the interested parties."'1 In its reasoning the
court expresses its desire to protect the best interests of the child." The
court in Sorensen mentions Strnad as holding that a child conceived by
artificial insemination with the husband's consent is legitimate but does so
without any reference to the semi-adoption theory. The other case holding
the husband to be the father, People v. Dennett12 did so by way of dicta on
grounds of public policy. In Dennett, the .mother defended her refusal to
allow her ex-husband the visitation privileges provided for in the divorce
decree on the grounds that the children were conceived by artificial insemina-
tion, and therefore the plaintiff was not their father. The court held that since
the defendant had never raised the issue of artificial insemination in the
separation or divorce proceedings, she was now estopped from doing so. The
court concluded, by way of dicta, that the child was legitimate and by implica-
tion that the husband was the father.
It may be further reasoned ... that whatever now motivates respondent to assert
the claim of artificial insemination . . . most assuredly does not inure to the
7 Strnad v. Strnad, 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (i948).
SId. at 787, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
9Id.
10 Supra note 7 at 787, 78 N.Y.S.2d 392.
11 Supra note 7 at 787, 78 N.Y.S.2d 391.
12People ex rel. Abajian v. Dennett, 15 Misc., 2d 260, 184 N.Y.S.2d 178 (1958).
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benefit of the children. For to stigmatize them as children of an unknown father
by means of artificial insemination ... is no more, in my view, than an attempt to
make these innocents out as children of bastardy .... 18
Two more recent cases, have held the husband not to be the father. Both
of these cases involved the problem of civil liability for child support and
therefore have a closer relationship to Sorensen. In Gursky v. Gursky,'1 4 an
action for annulment, the husband contended that the marriage was never
consummated and that there was no issue as a result of the marriage. The court
agreed with this contention, holding by implication that the husband was not
the father of the child conceived by artificial insemination. The court reached
this conclusion by relying on the Illinois case of Doornbos v. Doornbos.15 The
Doornbos court held:
Heterologous artificial insemination (when the donor is a third party) with of.
without the consent of the husband, is contrary to public policy and good morals
and constitutes adultery on the part of the mother and the father has no right or
interest in the child.1 6
It is difficult to determine what weight Doornbos will have in future cases
since the holding therein is neither based on precedent nor accompanied by a
discussion of the court's reasoning in reaching its conclusion. The Gursky
court went on to reject the Strnad decision, criticizing the semi-adoption
theory on the grounds that it was an attempt to contravene the adoption
statutes. However, the court in Gursky did find that the husband was liable
for the support of the child. The holdings in Gursky were essentially accepted
in a similar factual situation in the next year by the court in Anonymous v.
Anonymous.
17
Although Sorensen found liability for non-support, as did Gursky, it predi-
cated the liability on entirely different grounds. To fully understand this hold-
ing, it will be useful to analyze the grounds upon which Gursky predicated
liability, notwithstanding its finding of non-paternity. The civil liability for
support in Gursky was based on estoppel, the court holding that the husband
by his consent created an implied contract to support and was estopped from
denying his liability. Anonymous, following this reasoning, came to a similar
conclusion.
Although the civil cases were able to base liability on grounds of estoppel,
notwithstanding a lack of paternity, Sorensen, being criminal in nature, did
not have this alternative. Being a criminal action, a determination of non-
18 Id. at 263-64, 184 N.Y.S.2d at 182-83.
14 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1963).
'IDoornbos v. Doornbos, No. 54 S. 14981 (Superior Court, Cook Co., Dec. 13, 1954).
16 Id.
17 41 Misc. 2d 886, 246 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1964).
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paternity was fatal to the state, for while it may be possible that some element
of a criminal action may be based on estoppel, criminal liability in toto cannot,
as it would be a deprivation of due process. The state at the appellate court
level did attempt to use the estoppel theory in a unique manner, contending
that the defendant by his consent was estopped from denying his paternity,
one element of the crime. The court rejected this contention, reasoning that
the only cases presented by the state in which estoppel was permitted in
criminal actions, were cases of embezzlement,' and therefore in the court's
opinion, estoppel was not permissible for proving paternity. The appellate
court, noting that the three classical methods for establishing paternity were
not applicable,'0 and rejecting the state's estoppel argument, concluded that
the state had not sustained its burden of proving the defendant's paternity
and therefore criminal liability could not exist.
In vacating the appellate court's judgment and affirming the trial court's
decision, the Supreme Court held that a consenting husband to artificial in-
semination was the lawful father of a child so conceived within the meaning
of section 270 of the California Penal Code and therefore liable for non-sup-
port. The court did not consider the theory of estoppel in reaching this con-
clusion although estoppel was the basis of both lower courts' decisions. The
crucial issue in Sorensen was a determination of whether the legal relation-
ship of father-child existed. The court held that the word father within the
meaning of section 270 is not limited to a natural father, and that since the
donor is not the natural father within the meaning of that word, none would
exist, and therefore the court must look for a lawful father. This re-
quired an interpretation of the statute, first as to the meaning of the
word father, by using principles of statutory construction, and then an
interpretation of the statute in toto, in light of legislative intent as to the
objective to be reached. The court by applying two principles of statutory
construction 20 held the defendant to be the lawful father, stating that ". . . a
reasonable man who, because of his inability to procreate, actively partici-
pates and consents to his wife's artificial insemination . . . knows that such
behavior carries with it the legal responsibilities of fatherhood and criminal
responsibility for nonsupport."2' The court then found that although the
legislature probably did not consider cases of artificial insemination, "the
18 People v. Sorensen, 254 Cal. App. 2d at -, 62 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1967).
19 Id. at -, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 464.
20 68 Cal. 2d at -, 437 P.2d at 499:
Penal statutes are to be construed according to the fair import of their terms, with a
view to effect its objects and to promote justice. . . . [t]he Court must endeavor, if
possible, to view the statute from the standpoint of a reasonable man who might be
subject to its terms . ...
21 Id. at -, 437 P.2d at 499.
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intent ... obviously was to include every child, legitimate or illegitimate, born
or unborn, and enforce the obligation of support against the person who could
be determined to be the lawful parent.122 The court found that viewing the
statutes with the expanded interpretation of "father" "does not distort the
statutory language, and it achieves the statutory objective of providing sup-
port for the child and prevents an obvious injustice .... ,,23 In reaching this
conclusion, the court cites Gursky for its implied contract theory. The court
further supports its holding on the grounds of public policy in that if the con-
senting husband were not liable, the child would become a ward of the state
in the event of the mother's inability to support. The court further notes that
to hold any other way would be to place the social stigma of having no father
on the child and would therefore not be in his best interests. Sorensen also
holds, by way of dicta, that in the absence of a statute prohibiting artificial
insemination, the child is legitimate and was not the product of an adulterous
relationship.24 In supporting these holdings, the court notes the absurdities
reached if insemination were considered an adulterous act. The court supports
its legitimacy holding, on the grounds that the public policy of the state
favors legitimation and that no valid purpose could be served by holding
otherwise. Although the court does reach these conclusions, it did so by way
of dicta, recognizing that these areas are properly subjects for legislative
action.
Being the first case in which a court of last resort has faced the issue of
artificial insemination, Sorensen is extremely important. The court's deter-
mination of paternity and criminal liability for non-support was restricted to
section 270 of the California Penal Code. However, the overall import of the
decision, considering the dicta regarding legitimacy and adultery, represents
a complete reversal and liberalization of judicial attitude towards artificial
insemination, as contrasted with the holdings in Doornbos which were repre-
sentative of the prior judicial attitude on artificial insemination. Sorensen, by
holding that the consenting husband is the lawful father, the child is legiti-
mate, and the wife is not an adulteress, reaches conclusions exactly opposite
to Doornbos. Since Doornbos was a trial court decision, neither citing prec-
edents nor providing reasoning to support its holding, the well-reasoned
opinion of the Sorensen court and sensible results reached therein will be
influential in creating a favorable judicial attitude towards artificial insemina-
tion in the United States.
Sorensen is of further importance, being a case of first impression as to the
criminal liability for non-support of a consenting husband to artificial insem-
22 Id. at-, 437 P.2d at 498.
23 Id. at-, 437 P.2d at 501.
24 Id. at -, 437 P.2d at 501.
[Vol. XVII
CASE NOTES
ination. In jurisdictions where the objectives of the particular criminal sup-
port statute are similar to the California Code and it appears that the legisla-
ture has not considered the problem of artificial insemination, Sorensen will
be authority for broadening the interpretation of "father" within the partic-
ular criminal statute so as to encompass the husband who consents to artificial
insemination. In jurisdictions where the legislature has refused to consider
proposed artificial insemination legislation, 25 this refusal may be interpreted
as an intention by the legislature to preserve a strict interpretation of "father"
and therefore Sorensen may not be applicable. A reasonable alternative for
basing liability in this situation would be to hold the consenting husband
estopped from denying his paternity. Although this argument was rejected by
the appellate court in Sorensen,26 the strength of this rejection is questionable
in light of Justice Finlayson's concurring opinion in People v. Main,27 a case
not cited by the court, in which a general rule for when estoppel should be
available in criminal cases was set forth.
The sole basis for the application of the doctrine of estoppel in criminal cases is
the existence in some individual of a private right, depending for existence upon
the acts of estoppel, which right was invaded by the accused when he committed the
crime.28
Applying this rule to Sorensen, the child's right to support is dependent for
existence on an estoppel arising out of the defendant's consent, and it is the
violation of this right which constituted the crime. This application is sup-
ported by the Tennessee case of Hale v. State,29 a criminal action for failure
to support a wife. Here the defendant alleged that since he had entered into
a common law marriage, and Tennessee does not recognize the validity of such
a marriage, he was not legally the husband and therefore could not be liable
for support. The court found the defendant guilty of non-support, holding
that although his common law marriage was invalid, he was estopped from
denying its validity. Thus in a criminal support action, the defendant was
estopped from denying his relation as husband to the person he failed to sup-
port. This is analogous to Sorensen where, instead of estoppel being used to
establish the husband-wife relationship, it was attempted as a means of estab-
lishing the father-son relationship. Little, if any difference, can be seen
between the two situations.
25 Indiana (1949) ; Minnesota (1949) ; New York (1948, 1950) ; Ohio (1955) ; Virginia
(1948); Wisconsin (1949); Medicolegal Aspects of Artificial Insemination: A Current
Appraisal, A.M.A.J. 1640 (April 30, 1955).
26 254 Cal. App. 2d -, 62 Cal. Rptr. 465.
27 People v. Main, 75 Cal. App. 471, 242 P. 1078 (1926).
28 Id. at 1084.
29 179 Tenn. 201, 164 S.W.2d 822 (1942).
1968]
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
The reasoning of Sorensen will probably be extended so as to place liability
on the consenting husband under civil support statutes. Once again, this ap-
plication would be valid only in jurisdictions where there was apparently no
legislative consideration of artificial insemination, and the objectives of the
statute were similar to those of section 270 of the California Penal Code.
Where these limitations are not met, a reasonable alternative in this situation
would be to predicate liability for civil support on a theory of estoppel or
implied contract as in Gursky.
In the absence of legislative action to the contrary, the dicta in Sorensen
will be authority for the proposition that a child conceived by artificial in-
semination is legitimate, and the act itself, when done with the husband's
consent, does not constitute adultery. What position the courts will take re-
garding these matters, when the husband does not consent, is questionable. It
seems fairly certain however that Sorensen will not be applicable.
Sorensen will probably be influential in instigating legislation. As well
reasoned a decision as Sorensen is, it is still a stop-gap solution at best. The
Sorensen court recognized this need for legislative action in its opinion.80 In
prospective, Sorensen represents a step forward by the courts, in recognizing
the unique problems raised by artificial insemination and the need for re-
sponsible solutions, and in so doing will surely act as a gentle prod to state
legislatures in general and the California legislature in particular.
It is apparent that the present laws are inadequate in resolving all the legal
problems created by artificial insemination. Satisfactory solutions can only
be attained through legislative action. Although legislation has been proposed
in a few states,81 Oklahoma and Georgia8 2 have been the only states to take
positive action. In May 1967, Oklahoma passed a statute33 allowing artificial
insemination to be performed by licensed physicians where the written con-
sent of both the wife and husband had been obtained. The statute provides
that a child so conceived shall be deemed in law the same as a naturally con-
ceived child. As pointed out in a recent medical journal, it is not as important
what the legislature says, as that it says something. "At least any stand would
constitute a bit of terra firma in a sea of uncertainty. '34 In considering the
need for legislative action, the words of Justice Cardozo are well taken: "[I] t
is for the legislature to declare when conscience is disturbed.18 5 There is an
80 Supra note 20 at -, 437 P.2d at 501.
31 Supra note 25.
82 74 GA. CODE ANN. § 74-101.1 (Supp. 1964).
83 OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 551-553 (Supp. 1967).
34 Abel, The Present Status of Artificial Insemination, 85 SURGERY GYNECOLOGY AND
OSTERnIcs 528 (1947).
8 5 People v. Westchester Co. National Bank, 231 N.Y. 465, 487, 132 N.E. 241 (1921).
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analogy to be drawn between the present situation and that of a child con-
ceived in a bigamous marriage. In this instance the Illinois legislature en-
acted a statute making the child legitimate.3 6 So long as the Illinois legislature
refuses to take any action regarding the legal status of artificial insemination,
no reason can be seen for not enacting a statute, as in Georgia,3 7 legitimizing
the children so conceived in an effort to protect these innocents.
Walter Birk
3 6 
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 89, § 17(a) (1967).
37 Supra note 32.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-DEFENDANT'S
RIGHTS DURING EXTRA-JUDICIAL
IDENTIFICATION DEFINED
Ernest Crume was arrested by the Houston, Texas police for drunkenness
on December 14, 1956. Later the police questioned him concerning a robbery
which had occurred four days earlier, and in pursuit of their suspicions, had
him appear in several lineups. As a result of one of these lineups and an
individual confrontation, he was identified by the victim of the robbery and
subsequently convicted. During the lineup in which the identification was
made, the officers singled the defendant out from the other participants,
forced him to wear a hat and to repeat the words, "This is a stickup." In the
later confrontation, which occurred in a private office, he was asked to wear a
jacket which matched the description of that worn by the robber and to
walk alone past the witness, again repeating the words he had spoken in the
lineup. In both instances, the individual attention focused on the defendant
was not police-instigated, but was arranged at the request of the witness in
order that she might be as certain as possible before making a positive identi-
fication. In a federal habeas corpus proceeding, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas denied the defendant relief. In af-
firming that decision, the United States Courts of Appeals addressed itself
primarily to Crume's contention that the police, by exerting a suggestive in-
fluence on the witness, had rendered the means of identification so unfair as to
be in violation of his right to due process. Crume v. Beto, 383 F.2d 36 (5th
Cir. 1967).'
1 Circuit Judge Rives specially concurred in the result only, on the grounds that the
prisoner had not exhausted his state remedies as to the question of due process and that
the question was not properly before the court since it had not been considered or decided
by the Federal District Court. Crume v. Beto, 383 F.2d 36, 41 (5th Cir. 1967).
1968]
